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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

M\l 41990

OoOoo
Oliver Benjamin Gerrish, Jr.,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not for Publication)
Case No. 900188-CA

The State of Utah, M. Eldon
Barnes, Warden, Utah State
Prison,
Respondent and Appellee,

Before Judges Billings, Davidson, and Greenwood. (On Law &
Motion).
PER CURIAM:
Petitioner appeals the trial court's dismissal of his
petition for writ of habeas corpus. We summarily affirm the
trial court's dismissal upon our own motion for summary
disposition pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 10(e).
On September 25, 1985, petitioner, Oliver Benjamin
Gerrish, pled guilty to aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a
first degree felony and was sentenced to a minimum mandatory
term of six years to life in the Utah State Prison. On appeal
to the Utah Supreme Court, petitioner challenged the minimum
mandatory sentencing scheme. The court affirmed the sentence
as constitutional. Petitioner also filed a motion with the
supreme court seeking dismissal of his conviction-sentencing.
The court dismissed the motion without explanation, terming it
a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In May 1989, petitioner
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court
attacking his guilty plea conviction. The court dismissed the
petition as successive and procedurally barred. Petitioner
appealed and the Utah Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack
of prosecution.
In June 1989, petitioner filed a motion to set aside the
guilty plea. The court denied the motion, stating that the
record as a whole established that petitioner entered his plea
knowingly, intelligently and with full understanding of the
rights that he was waiving and of the potential consequences of
the entry of his plea. Petitioner appealed and the case was

trial court's dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas
corpus because the appeal presents no substantial question for
review.
ALL CONCUR:

Qjc&L wJudi

SU^f^J

Billings, Judge
^^L&hfs*^

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

rfJo/K^/x 8.

J An 3 0 1390

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

OLIVER BENJAMIN GERRISH, JR.,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Petitioner,

CASE NO.

890906266 HC

vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH, M. ELDON
BARNES, Warden, Utah State
Prison,
Respondent.

For the reasons set

forth

in

respondent's

Memorandum

in

Support of their Motion to Dismiss,
IT IS ORDERED, that this matter be and hereby is dismissed.
Dated this So^

day of January, 1990.

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

GERRISH V. STATE

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

of
this

I hereby certify that I mailed a true

and

the

to

foregoing

Order

of

Dismissal,

correct

copy

the following,

J o ^ a y of January, 1990:

Oliver Benjamin Gerrish, Jr.
Pro se
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84 02 0
Dan R. Larsen
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

2

OF SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH
*

3
4

*

*

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

5
6

vs.

7

OLIVER BENJAMIN GERRISH,

8

Case No. CR85-1142
CR85-1143

Defendant.

9
BE IT REMEMBERED that the above-entitled cause

10
11

came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable

12

Timothy R. Hanson, a Judge of the Third Judicial District

13

Court of the State of Utah, at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake

14

County, State of Utah on the 29th day of September, 1989,

15

at 9:00 a.m., and that the following proceedings were

16

had.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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sworn, please, sir.
HARLAN Y. HAMMOND
Called as a witness in behalf of the defendant, was
sworn and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. Alba:
Q.

Would you give us your name for the record,

please?
A.

Harlan Y. Hammond.

Q.

Mr. Hammond, how are you employed, sir?

A.

I'm chief counsel for Financial

Administrative Services, which is a legal and accounting
firm.
Q.

And Mr. Hammond, how long —

are you an

attorney, sir?
A*

Yes, I am.

Q.

Admitted to practice in the State of Utah?

A*

Yes.

Q.

And how long have you been admitted to

practice in this State?
A.

Since 1961.

Q.

And since 1961, Mr. Hammond, have you

practiced within the State of Utah?
A.

Yes, I have.

Q.

Have you practiced elsewhere other than
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within the State?
A,

No, I haven't.

Q.

And what has been the nature of your

practice, sir, if you can characterize it for the court?
A.

Basically it has been some corporate work,

some domestic law, some estate planning.

Last six years

I've done quite a lot of trusts, and the like.
Q.

During the period of time, sir, since 1961,

have you been engaged in doing any criminal defense work,
sir?
A.

No, I haven't.

Q.

Now, were you the attorney, sir, who

undertook the representation of Mr. Gerrish sometime in
1985?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And would you relate to the court the

circumstances under which you became engaged to represent
Mr. Gerrish?
A,

Yes. Mr. Gerrish lived in an apartment two

houses up from where I lived on First South.

I lived at

1245 East First South at the time, and I was well
acquainted with Mr. Gerrish.
his situation.

I was well acquainted with

We were talking out on the parking of my

home there at the time that I learned that he was
requesting —

going to be picked up for a matter, and I
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Q.

Had you undertaken to represent anyone

charged with the same type of crimes that were alleged
against Mr. Gerrish prior to that date in 1985 when you
appeared in front of Judge Hanson?
A.

I don't believe I did.

Q.

Prior to your appearance, sir, in front of

Judge Hanson on September 25th of 1985, had you had any
conversations with representatives from the county
attorneys office regarding any plea agreement to be
reached regarding this case?
k.

Yes.

Q.

With whom, sir, did you have these

conversations ?
A.

It was a lady attorney, and I don't remember

her name.
Q.

Karen Knight-Eagan?

Do you recall that?

A.

Very likely.

Q.

How many conversations did you have with Ms.

Knight-Eagan?
A.

I believe I talked with her on the telephone

prior to the plea hearing, and I believe I talked with
her just before the hearing.
Q.

Right before the hearing itself here in

court?
A.

Yes.
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Q.

Now, did you ever take an opportunity, sir,

after your conversations with Ms. Knight-Eagan, to relay
to Mr. Gerrish the substance of that agreement that had
been reached with the prosecution in this case?
A.

Yes.

attempting to do.

I conveyed to him what they were
They asked if he had —

if he would —

if he would plead guilty to one of the cases brought
before him.
Q»

And he had how many cases?

A.

He had two.

That they would drop one case,

and as nearly as I can recollect, strive for a three year
sentence.
Q.

Okay.

Now, what is your specific

recollection, Mr. Hammond, about a three year sentence?
A.

Well, what do you mean?

Q.

You mentioned a three year sentence, sir, and

I don't understand in what context that came up.
A.

Well, the law allows three types of

sentencing for this kind of matter, and one is three
years, one is six years, and one is nine years.
Q.

And that was your understanding, sir, of what

the statute provided for in terms of possible sentences
in the event of a change of plea by Mr. Gerrish?
A.

Yes.

Yes, it was.

Q.

It is your testimony today that you conveyed
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that to Mr, Gerrish prior to his appearance in front of
the court for the change of plea?
A.
Gerrish.

I don't know how much I conveyed to Mr.
I conveyed to him what the prosecuting attorney

had told me.
Q.

And I'm not sure I understand exactly what

that was, sir.
A.

Well, that was that one case would be

dismissed, and that the prosecuting attorney thought that
she could get him off on a three year sentence.
Q.

And what did you understand that three year

sentence to be?

That Mr. Gerrish would serve three years

only?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you convey that to Mr. Gerrish?

A.

I believe I did.

Q.

And you were present at the time that Judge

I'm sure I did.

Hanson advised Mr. Gerrish of possible sentences that
could be imposed on September 25th, 1985, were you not,
sir?
A.

Yes, I was here.

Q.

And do you recall the Judge telling Mr.

Gerrish that he could receive five years under one set of
circumstances, ten years under another set of
circumstances, or fifteen years under a third set of

Page 22
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Q.

(By Mr. Alba)

Mr. Hammond, at any time on

September 25th, 1985, when Mr. Gerrish entered his plea
of guilty, sir, do you recall ever advising the court of
the conversation that you had had with the probation —
excuse me, with the prosecutor's office regarding the
possible three year sentence that could be imposed on Mr.
Gerrish?
A.

I don't recall.

I don't think I did.

Q.

Do you recall, sir, having raised that

particular issue again, the three year possible sentence,
on October 21st, 1985, at the time of Mr. Gerrish's
sentencing?
A.

NO.

Q.

Were you aquainted, Mr. Hammond, with any of

the alleged victims who were named in the three separate
criminal charges that were brought against Mr. Gerrish?
A.

I was somewhat.

didn't know them —

I lived in their ward.

I

well, I knew the parents, but I don't

recall the children, and I didn't recall the children at
that time.
Q.

Did you ever have any conversations with the

parents during the course of your representations with
Mr. Gerrish?
A.

It was just one time.

Q.

And when did that occur in relation to the

Page 25

of the possible penalties that you could receive under
the statute?
A.

No, sir.

Q.

You heard his testimony, sir, regarding some

discussion about three years.

What is your recollection,

sir, about the three years?
A.

It came when we were in the jury room, Mr.

Hammond told me, "Oliver, if you plead guilty to one
count, the prosecutor has agreed to drop the other two.
The prosecute has promised me that you will receive only
a three year sentence.

You will be out in three years.

The Judge knows about this, so there is no need for you
to bring it up in court.

It is all set up."

That's a

quote.
Q.

You appeared —

perspective.

well, let me just put it in

Did you meet with Mr. Hammond on the 23rd,

and is that why you were filling out the affidavit in the
jury room?
A.

I don't recall the date, but —

Q.

Eventually you appeared in court on the 25th

in front of Judge Hanson, and entered a plea of guilty to
one count; is that correct, sir?
A*

Yes, sir.

Q.

Did you ever bring up with the court, sir,

what Mr. Hammond had told you about in the jury room?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Was Mr. Hammond present in court, sir, when

you appeared after sentencing for the reduction of
sentence that occurred in I believe it was February of
1986?
A*

It was February 16th, 1986.

Q.

Who represented you in those proceedings?

A.

Counsel Joe Carol Nesset-Sale.

Q.

Was she counsel who had undertaken to

represent your case, sir, on appeal during that period of
time?
A.

I was made to understand on the 16th that she

had been appointed to represent me, but that was the only
time I saw her.
Q.

You are presently in custody, sir, at the

Utah State Prison?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And have been in continuous custody since

when, sir?
A.

Since I was arrested.

I believe I was

arrested August 29th, 1985.
Q.

And on any other charges other than the ones

presently before the court?
A.

No, sir.

Q.

There is no other holds, no other charges
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Number two, counsel must if an agreement is reached,
advise the defendant of what that agreement consists of,
and advise the court of what that agreement consists of.
It is uncontroverted that the three year discussion took
place.

In fact, Mr. Hammond's recollection was that he

had told that to Mr. Gerrish, that the prosecution had
made those representations regarding the three years.
And I think it's evident, and clear from the record that
when those items are presented to the defendant, and the
defendant relies on those representations, then anything
that occurs in court is not voluntary because of that.
And for that proposition, Your Honor, I have a case —
the only case that I was able to find regarding that
particular area, if I may submit a copy to the court at
this point, and I have a copy for counsel as well.

This

is a Third Circuit Court of Appeals case in United States
versus Marsgliano.

And in essence, the issue that was

presented in that case concerns the voluntariness of a
plea of guilty that was entered into by a defendant who
had been told, and made certain representations by his
counsel —

given advice not to follow, or not to bring

that up at the time of the plea or in front of the court,
and then a different sentence was imposed.

In that

particular case, the Third Circuit reversed the matter,
sent it back down.

This came up on a writ of habeas
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corpus, where the court below the District Court had
denied a hearing.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals

felt that there was sufficient evidence presented
concerning the voluntariness of the plea when that set of
circumstances occurs, where an individual defendant is
given certain information, he relies on that information,
and then to his detriment,the court does not follow that
particular recommendation because it never becomes part
of the record.
That is another instance, Your Honor, of the
ineffective assistance of counsel that was presented, and
demonstrated by Mr. Hammond in this particular case. A
third instance, Your Honor, deals with the waiver that
occurs.

And I asked Mr. Hammond his recollection.

He

was negligent, and I think that's being kind concerning
any discussion at all about a preliminary hearing.

And

there are myriad cases in this particular jurisdiction,
Your Honor, that deal with the importance of a
preliminary hearing.

It is not a perfunctory matter, it

is in fact a hearing that entitles a defendant to a
determination of probable cause.

In this particular

case, Mr. Hammond's recollection regarding that was
simply that he had none.

Mr. Gerrish's recollection

regarding that was that Mr. Hammond advised him it would
be of no import, and to waive the preliminary hearing.
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Utah§tateBar
Office of Bar Counsel
645 South 200 East • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3834
Telephone: (801) 531-9110 • (WATS) 1-800-662-9054
A8A/Net: ABA 1152

October 7, 1988

Mr. Oliver B. Gerrish
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
RE:

Complaint against Harlan Y. Hammond

Dear Mr. Gerrish:
... Per the request of your letter of September 20,
1988, and our recent telephone conversation, I am
providing to you the two ethical rules which the
Screening Panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee
of the Utah State Bar found that Mr. Hammond had
violated. The Panel found that Mr. Hammond violated
Canon 6, DR6-10KA)(1) which prohibits a lawyer from
handling a legal matter which he knows or should know
that he is not competent to handle. In your case the
Panel felt that Mr. Hammond was not sufficiently
familiar with the criminal law relating to your sexual
abuse charge and the sentencing ohase.
The Panel also found that Mr. Hammond violated
Canon 5. DR5-105(A) which requires that a lawyer
decline employment if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or
is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of
the proffered employment. The Panel believed that Mr.
Hammond displayed some bias about the ultimate
sentencing outcome of the criminal charge against vou
and that he improperly confused his professional role
and his ecclesiastical role and failed to act properly
in his role as an attorney.
you.

I hope that the above information is helpful to
Again, I would remind you that this discipline is

private and would ask that you use discretion in
disclosing this information.

CAB/dlb

/rfP&O'blX £ :
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UNITED STATES v. MARZGLIANO
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Cite as 588 F.2d 395 (1978)

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
Salvatore MARZGLIANO, Joseph Mogavera, Paul R. Labriola, Thomas Graham,
Bernard Carroll, William Sevransky, Anthony Noto, Peter Scheib, Carlo Joseph
Scala, Richard Campo, Ciro J. Graziano,
Timothy Mitteager, Marilyn Wallace, Jerome Otieri, Richard Gunn, Theodore
Mendel.
Appeal of Joseph MOGAVERA.
No. 78-1169.
United States Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit.
Argued Sept. 8, 1978.
Decided Nov. 27, 1978.
Appeal was taken from an order of the
United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey, Vincent P. Biunno, J., denying defendant's motion for dismissal of indictment or, alternatively, for withdrawal
of guilty plea and subsequent sentence.
The Court of Appeals, James Hunter, III,
Circuit Judge, held that: (1) defendant who
produced his testimony, testimony of codefendant and testimony of an attorney showing misrepresentations by defense counsel
regarding sentencing was entitled to a
hearing to prove that guilty plea was not
voluntary because of such misrepresentations and (2) transfer of defendant from
federal facility back to state prison after
acceptance of defendant's guilty plea but
before sentencing did not violate Interstate
Agreement on Detainers where transfer
from state to federal custody was achieved
pursuant to writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.

federal facility back to state prison after
acceptance of his guilty plea but before
sentencing, when the transfer from state to
federal custody had been achieved pursuant
to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, did not violate Agreement Interstate
Agreement on Detainers Act, § 2, art.
IV(e), 18 U.S.C.A. App.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Criminal Law <8=»273.1(2)
Fact that no sentencing agreement actually existed between trial judge and defense counsel was not relevant to issue
whether defendant's guilty plea was induced by false promise from defense counsel regarding sentencing.
3. Criminal Law <s=>273.1(2)
Defendant's statements at voluntariness hearing to the effect that neither his
attorney nor Government had made any
promises to him inducing him to plead
guilty did not bar defendant from subsequently asserting that guilty plea was not
voluntary because of misrepresentations by
his counsel as to sentencing which would be
imposed, particularly since trial judge allegedly involved in impropriety was judge
before whom voluntariness hearing took
place. Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. rule 11, 18
U.S.C.A.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

4. Criminal Law s=>997.16(5)
Defendant who asserted that his guilty
plea was not voluntary because of out-ofcourt representations by his counsel as to
sentence that would be imposed and whose
assertions were supported by his codefendant and another attorney who were present
when defense counsel made representations
made sufficient showing to entitle him to
hearing to prove that guilty plea was not
voluntary. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255.

1. Courts <s=>495
Writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is not a "detainer" within contemplation of Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act so that transfer of defendant from

Ralph A. Jacobs, Asst. U. S. Atty., Robert
J. Del Tufo, U. S. Atty., Frank C. Razzano,
Newark, N. J., for appellee.
Ronald A. Cohen, Larry Bronson, Orange,
N. J., for appellant.
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Before
GIBBONS, HUNTER
GARTH, Circuit Judges.

and

OPINION OF THE COURT
JAMES HUNTER, III, Circuit Judge:
Joseph Mogavera appeals from the denial
of a motion for dismissal of his indictment
or, in the alternative, for withdrawal of his
guilty plea and subsequent sentence. Without a hearing, the district court denied relief determining first, that the dismissal of
the indictment was not mandated by the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 18
U.S.C. app. § 2 (1976), and second, that
Mogavera had not demonstrated that his
guilty plea was involuntary under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1976). We agree that the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers was not violated,
though on different grounds from those
advanced by the district court. However,
we hold that Mogavera is entitled to a
hearing on the voluntariness of his guilty
plea.
I.
On August 5, 1974 Mogavera and fifteen
others were indicted for conspiracy to forge
and utter United States Savings Bonds and
for the substantive offense of forging United States Savings Bonds in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 371 and 495 (1976). Mogavera
was also charged with failure to file an
income tax return. He was arraigned in
United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey on September 20, 1974; he
pleaded not guilty and was released on bail.
While awaiting trial on the federal charges,
he pleaded guilty to a New York state
charge in February, 1975, and was sentenced to a three year term. He began
serving his sentence in a New York state
prison on March 10,1975. On June 13, 1975
the federal government procured his trans1. The Supreme Court has recently held that the
United States is a party to the Agreement both
as a sending and a receiving "State." United
States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 353, 98 S.Ct.
1834, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978).
2. Article IV(e) of the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers, 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 (1976), provides:

fer to the federal correctional facility in
New York City pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.
While in federal custody, Mogavera
pleaded guilty to the forgery and tax
charges on June 27, 1975. The district
court judge conducted a hearing to determine the voluntariness of Mogavera's guilty
plea as required by Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under oath,
Mogavera declared that neither his attorney
nor the government had made any promises
to him which induced him to plead guilty.
Mogavera does not challenge the sufficiency of the Rule 11 proceeding.
After the acceptance of the plea, he was
returned to the state facility pending the
preparation of the federal probation report.
On October 6, 1975 he was again transferred to federal custody pursuant to a writ of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum. He was
sentenced by the district court judge on
October 24, 1975 to a five year term—to run
consecutive to his state sentence—and to
five years probation to follow his release
from custody.
II.
Mogavera first contends that he is entitled to the dismissal of his indictment on
the federal charges because his rights under
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
were violated. The Agreement governs the
transfer of a prisoner from a jurisdiction
where he is serving a sentence to another
jurisdiction for proceedings against him.1
Under article IV(e), if the prisoner is returned to the original place of imprisonment before being tried in the second jurisdiction, then his indictment in the second
jurisdiction must be dismissed with prejudice.2
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment,
information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to
the original place of imprisonment pursuant
to article V(e) hereof, such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any
further force or effect, and the court shall
enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.

UNITED STATES v. MARZGLIANO
Cite as 588 F.2d 395 (1978)

The district court held that the transfer
of Mogavera from the federal facility back
to the state prison after the acceptance of
Mogavera's guilty plea but before sentencing did not violate the Agreement. The
court read article IV(e) as requiring dismissal only if "trial is not had on any indictment
prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of imprisonment.,, See note 2 supra (emphasis supplied). Thus, it reasoned that the Agreement does not prevent transfers after the
prisoner is tried in the second jurisdiction.
Since it determined that the entry of a
guilty plea is the legal equivalent of a "trial," the district court held that the postguilty plea transfers were outside the ambit
of the Agreement.
[1] We need not reach the merits of the
district court's statutory construction. After the district court's decision, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 360, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 56
L.Ed.2d 329 (1978), that a writ of habeas
corpus ad prosequendum is not a "detainer"
within the meaning of the Agreement.3 In
each instance, Mogavera's transfer from
state to federal custody was achieved pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. Since the writ does not invoke
the protections of the Agreement, Mogavera is not entitled to the dismissal of his
indictment.4
3. This court's holding in United States v. Sor~
rell, 562 F.2d 227 (3d Or. 1977), that a writ of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum was a "detainer" under the Agreement, was in effect
overturned by the Supreme Court in Mauro,
436 U.S. at 349 n.14, 98 S.Ct. at 1841. The district court had relied in part on Sorreii
4. The court also held in United States v. Mauro
that the protections of the Agreement apply if
the federal government first lodges a detainer
against a prisoner and later secures custody of
the prisoner pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. 436 U.S. at 361-365, 98
S.Ct. 1847-1849. The record does not disclose a
detainer against Mogavera prior to the issuance
of the writs so Mogavera does not benefit from
this holding.
5. Section 2255 of Title 28 U.S.C. (1976), provides in part:
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III.
Mogavera contends alternatively that his
guilty plea was not voluntary. Under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 he is entitled to a hearing on
his petition "[u]nless the motion and the
files and records of the case conclusively
show that the prisoner is entitled to no
relief."5 (emphasis supplied) After reviewing the appropriate materials, the district court, without a hearing, denied relief.
We address solely the issue of whether Mogavera has demonstrated that he is entitled
to a hearing and do not decide whether
habeas corpus relief is warranted.
As the basis of his section 2255 claim,
Mogavera alleges that his attorney, Samuel
R. DeLuca, made false representations to
him which induced his guilty plea. In his
affidavit in support of the habeas corpus
petition, Mogavera claims that, "Mr. DeLuca promised me that if I plead guilty to one
count of this indictment, and one count of
the income tax information, that my sentence would not exceed the New York sentence, and would run concurrent with it."
App. at 24a. Mogavera received a five year
sentence to run consecutive to the state
sentence and five years probation on his
release from custody. Further, Mogavera
asserts: "Before I took the plea I was advised by Mr. DeLuca to say yes to all questions asked by the judge." Id.
Paul Labriola, Mogavera's co-defendant,
also submitted an affidavit in support of
Unless the motion and the files and records
of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause
notice thereof to be served upon the United
States attorney, grant a prompt hearing
thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court finds that the
judgment was rendered without jurisdiction,
or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral
attack, or that there has been such a denial
or infringement of the constitutional rights of
the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall
vacate and set the judgment aside and shall
discharge the prisoner or resentence him or
grant a new trial or correct the sentence as
may appear appropriate.
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Mogavera's petition. He claims that he was court asked whether his plea was voluntary.
present on an occasion when DeLuca prom- The lower court denied his motion without
ised Mogavera that the district court judge a hearing. This court held: "A plea in^
would give Mogavera a concurrent sentence duced. j?XJ*Sch_ misrepresentations jloes^not
or, at the worst, one or two years to run jneet the federaLstandard_p£ voluntariness.
consecutive to the New York sentence. In . .
H^^^^a^%aljmsjepresentaaddition, he reports that, "[DeLuca] told tion as to aJpror#3itiouLior>, a_ light _jenMr. Mogavera that it was guaranteed, and tence., Tha^2dlegaticji_is_sufficieiit-lQjcec
that if it did not happen as promised, he— quireJ;he holding^of^r^dy^raAry^hearjng/^
DeLuca—would take full responsibility, and 7 d at995. See Brady v. United States, 397*
Mr. Mogavera could withdraw his plea." "U.S. 7427755, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747
App. at 26.
(1970).
The crucial affidavit came from Robert
In McAleney v. United ^States,
^JF2A
Weiswasser, a member of the New York ^ 2 J l £ t ^ r ^ l 9 7 6 ^ defense counsel told his
Bar. He had originally represented both client that the prosecutor had agreed to
Mogavera and Labriola but withdrew from
recommend a light sentence. In fact, the
representation of Mogavera, apparently beprosecutor, when pressed for some prediccause of a potential conflict of interest. He
tion, had only given his personal opinion
recommended that Mogavera retain DeLuthat the defendant would receive a light
ca. Weiswasser states in his affidavit that
sentence; he never promised to give a reche was present when DeLuca promised Mogavera that if Mogavera pleaded guilty, ommendation. In granting the motion to
Mogavera would receive a sentence which withdraw the plea, the court held: "[The
would run concurrent with and not exceed defendant] was entitled to credit his attorthe sentence given by the New York state ney's representation as to the_fa.ctjof_jLUfih
an agreement, and to rely on it; and if his.
court. App. at 27a-28a.
guilty plea was in fact induced by such a
A careful reading of the affidavits indi- representation, we agree with the district
cates that DeLuca may have led Mogavera court that relief is in-order." Id. at 284.
to believe that he had a special relationship See generally Blackledge v. Allison, 431
with the district court judge and had U.S. 63, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136
"fixed" the sentence. The Supreme Court
(1977); Owens v. United States, 551 F.2d
wrote in Machibroda v. United States, 368_
1053 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 848, 98
U.S. 487, 493, 82"S.Ct.510.JMJLIbEd.2d.
S.Ct. 155, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977); United
473 (1962}, that, "[a] guilty plea, if induced
by promises
. which deprivejtjtf States v. Pallotta, 433 F.2d 594 (1st Cir.
1970); United States v. McCarthy, 433 F.2d
tlJeHsiTaracter of a voluntary^act, isrvoid» J^
591 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Del
conviction based upon such^a plea is open to
Piano, 386 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1967), cert
collateral .attack." This court confronted
denied, 392 U.S. 936, 88 S.Ct. 2306, 20
allegations similar to those made by MogavL.Ed.2d 1395 (1968).
era in Moorhead v. United Stajgs^456 F.2d
Thus, a claim of attorney misrepresenta992 (3dJ3ir. 1972)^ Moorhead contended in
his section 2255 motion that his attorney tion of the type pleaded here may be a basis
had represented to him that a "proposition" for relief in a habeas corpus action.* We
had been arranged with the prosecutor: if must determine, therefore, whether the dishe pleaded guilty, he would get no more trict court erred in denying Mogavera an
than a suspended sentence or full probation. opportunity to prove his allegations. The
He also alleged that his attorney directed statute requires a hearing "[u]nless the mohim to respond affirmatively when the tion and the files and records of the case
6. We note that this is not a case where the
defendant has merely alleged an erroneous prediction of sentence by his counsel, which this
court has held does not render a guilty plea

involuntary. Masciola v. United States, 469
F2d 1057, 1059 (3d Cir 1972). See Weilmtz v.
Page, 420 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1970).

UNITED STATES v. MARZGLIANO
Cite as 588 F.2d 395 (1978)

conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The
Supreme Court in Machibroda considered
the circumstances in which a hearing must
be provided:
The factual allegations contained in the
petitioner's motion and affidavit, and put
in issue by the affidavit filed with the
Government's response, related primarily
to purported occurrences outside the
courtroom and upon which the record
could, therefore, cast no real light. Nor
were the circumstances alleged of a kind
that the District Judge could completely
resolve by drawing upon his own personal
knowledge or recollection.
368 U.S. at 494-95, 82 S.Ct. at 514.
[2] The alleged
misrepresentations
which form the basis of Mogavera's section
2255 motion took place at out-of-court
meetings between Mogavera and his attorney. Also, the fact that no agreement actually existed between the district court judge
and Mogavera's attorney, a fact which
would be within the personal knowledge of
the district court, is not relevant to the
issue of whether or not Mogavera's guilty
plea was induced by a false promise from
his attorney. McAleney v. United States,
539 F.2d at 284. Thus, by alleging activities which took place outside the courtroom
and beyond the personal knowledge of the
district court judge, Mogavera brings himself squarely within the Machibroda standards. Accord, Brown v. United States, 565
F.2d 862, 863 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1977); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d at 995 (petitioner is entitled to a hearing where the
motion alleges "matters outside the record
which, if true, cast serious doubt upon the
voluntariness of the guilty plea").
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peatedly asked the defendant whether any
undisclosed promises were given to him by
either the government or his own attorney
which induced his plea. Mogavera stated
under oath that there was none. The
government contends that Mogavera cannot
now deny his earlier sworn statements. In
Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 93
S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973), the Supreme Court refused to allow the Rule 11
proceeding to foreclose later habeas corpus
attacks. While the Court conceded that a
defendant "'may not ordinarily' repudiate
his statements to the sentencing judge," it
held: "The objective of Fed.Rule Crim.
Proc. 11, of course, is to flush out and
resolve all such issues, but like any procedural mechanism, its exercise is neither always perfect nor uniformly invulnerable to
subsequent challenge." Id. at 215, 93 S.Ct.
at 1462. Accord, Blackledge v. Allison, 431
U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136
(1977) ("the barrier of the plea or sentencing proceeding record, although imposing, is
not invariably insurmountable").

[3] The government attempts to raise
the Rule 11 voluntariness colloquy as a bar
to Mogavera's present action. At the Rule
11 hearing, the district court judge re-

The McAleney court noted that "most
defendants could be expected to deny 'any
impropriety' during the Rule 11 hearing
and we cannot now say that it
would be obvious to a poorly counselled
defendant that he should mention a supposed 'deal' with the Government, no matter
how proper." 539 F.2d at 285.7 The rationale of McAleney applies with particular
force when, as alleged here, the defendant
may have been led to believe that the judge
before whom the Rule 11 colloquy took
place was himself involved in the "impropriety." Though we understand the efforts
of the government to reduce the flood of
prisoners recanting their Rule 11 statements in subsequent section 2255 motions,
we must heed the caution of Fontaine and
Blackledge that the Rule 11 voluntariness
hearing is an imperfect procedural mecha-

7. See also United States v. McCarthy, 433 F.2d
591, 593 (1st Cir. 1970), where the First Circuit
noted that "the courts have generally concluded that the Rule 11 record is 'evidential on the
issue of voluntariness
. . not conclu-

sive," citing United States ex rei McGrath v.
LaVallee, 319 F.2d 308, 314 (2d Cir. 1963).
Accord, Trotter v. United States, 359 F.2d 419,
420 (2d Cir. 1966); Scott v. United States, 349
F.2d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 1965).
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nism which must not be wholly immune
from collateral attack.8
IV.
[4] We hold that Mogavera's rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
were not violated since a writ of habeas
corpus ad prosequendum, the means by
which he was transferred from state to
federal custody, is not a "detainer" within
the contemplation of the Agreement^
However, Mogavera has made a sufficient '
showing under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to entitle '•
him to a hearing to prove that his guilty \
plea was not voluntary. The decision of the
" district court will be affirmed in part and
reversed in part.

Ginn BIESENBACH, Joseph Levin,
Henry Sharman, Lisa B. White,
Appellants,
v.
John H. GUENTHER, Jr., A. T. Consoli,
Richard E. Hunter, Fred Parquitte, Leon
Prince, Heidelberg, Inc., Appellees.
No, 78-1487.
United States Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit.
Argued Nov. 14, 1978.
Decided Dec. 4, 1978.
Minority shareholders brought suit
both derivatively and on behalf of ail shareholders against individual members of corporate board of directors, alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. The United States District Court for
8. We note that this court has recently affirmed
a conviction for perjury against a prisoner who
made sworn statements in his affidavit in support of his section 2255 motion which contra-

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Raymond J. Broderick, J., 446 F.Supp. 98, dismissed plaintiffs' federal claims for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted and, as a result, plaintiffs' pendent
state law claims were also dismissed. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals, Rosenn, Circuit Judge, held that although plaintiffs
alleged violations of individual defendants'
fiduciary duties as directors of the corporation which could support a cause of action
under laws of Pennsylvania, such allegations standing alone did not state a cause of
action under the Securities Exchange Act.
Affirmed.
1. Securities Regulation <s=>118
Although minority shareholders alleged
violations of individual defendants' fiduciary duties as directors of corporation which
could support a cause of action under laws
of Pennsylvania, such allegations standing
alone did not state a cause of action under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15
U.S.C.A. § 78j(b).
2. Securities Regulation <3=»118
The unclean heart of a corporate director is not actionable under the Securities
Exchange Act, whether or not it is disclosed, unless the impurities are translated
into actionable deeds or omissions both objective and external. Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b).
3. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>1832
On a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, district court must limit its consideration to the facts alleged in the complaint. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 12(b)(6), 28
U.S.C.A.
4. Federal Courts e=>624
Failure to request oral argument on a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted condieted his testimony under oath at the Rule 11
hearing. United States v. Stassi, 583 F.2d 122
(3d Cir. 1978).
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